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BOOK ESSAYS
New trends and old stereotypes in foreign aid
Ideas, Interests and Foreign Aid
A. Maurits van der Veen
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, 290 pp.
From Recipients to Donors: Emerging Powers and the Changing
Development Landscape
Emma Mawdsley
London: Zed Books, 2012, 270 pp.
How to Manage an Aid Exit Strategy: The Future of Development
Aid
Derek Fee
London: Zed Books, 2012, 256 pp.
The three volumes reviewed here are dealing with challenging and problematic areas
concerning foreign aid. All three discuss to a various degree, the powers and hidden
agendas in the donor–recipient relationships, the emergence of new donors in the
marketplace of aid and foreign aid as a tool to reach donors’ domestic goals. They
all emphasis that the new, global geo-political landscape changes aid relations in
significant ways, especially after ‘the war on terror’.
For sure, the landscape of development cooperation has been rapidly and funda-
mentally changing over the last few years after a decade or so characterized by
development aid fatigue. While Western donors of development aid prior to 1990
had given aid to all regimes, including authoritarian ones, as long as they promised
not to convert to communism, the end of the Cold War changed this pattern. The
culmination of the political competition between the USSR and the West was fol-
lowed by political conditions for receiving aid. France’s president Francois Mitter-
rand claimed in his famous ‘La Baule’ speech in 1990 that in the future, France
would only cooperate with democratic regimes that respect human rights (Mitterand,
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1990).1 Political conditions for receiving aid imposed in the early 1990s were added 
onto the economic conditions of privatization and liberalization that had already 
been imposed by the Washington Consensus since the beginning of the 1980s 
(Williamson, 1999). Donors, led by the World Bank (WB), imposed both economic 
and political conditionalities to make aid more effective. ‘Good governance’, 
understood as political democratization and liberalization and privatization of the 
economy became the ultimate slogan in foreign aid policy discussions and a 
precondition for receiving official aid.
Nevertheless, the 1990s turned out to be a decade of decreasing Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) despite the boom of formal democratization in 
former authoritarian regimes in Africa. Political speeches in donor countries pledging 
increased aid to encourage democratization were followed by shrinking disbursements 
to the recipients’ states. The US$54 billion handed out by Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries as ODA in 1990 had shrunk to US
$49 billion in 1997.2
Volumes of development aid
However, from 1997 onwards, development aid has again been on the increase. In real 
terms, ODA from OECD countries increased from US$49 billion in 1997 to US$131 
billion in 2010.3 In 2011, OECD countries disbursed an average of .31% of their Gross 
National Income (GNI) on aid. While this is still far from the agreed United Nations 
(UN) target of .7%, it is on the right track. Globally, only Sweden, Denmark, Norway 
and the Netherlands exceeded the UN aid target in 2011. The world’s largest donor in 
real terms, the USA, is among the stingiest, calculated as percentage of its GNI – its 
US$30.7 billion in development aid in 2011 only comprises a small .2% of its GNI.4 
Yet, 10 years earlier, US aid represented only .1% of GNI (van der Veen, 2011, p. 8). 
While the USA and most other Development Assistance Commettee (DAC) donors 
continued to increase development aid even after the 2008 financial crisis,5 a few 
countries, like Spain and Greece, have significantly reduced their real-term development 
aid despite the pre-2008 official policy of increasing aid.6
A key goal in van der Veen’s (2011) volume, Ideas, Interests and Foreign Aid, is to
prove that it is possible to measure motivations for development aid by categorizing
1For the entire speech (in French) see http://www.rfi.fr/actufr/articles/037/article_20103.asp. For
analysis of changes in French foreign policy toward Africa, see Hansen (2010b).
2http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=TABLE1#
3http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=REF_TOTALODA#
4http://www.oecd.org/aidstatistics
5http://www.oecd.org/development/aidstatistics/44285539.gif
6As late as 2007, the official aim of Greece’s development assistance was to reach .51% of the GNI
by 2012. In 2010, Greece disbursed 0.17% of GNI in aid. Annual Report of the Bilateral and Multi-
lateral ODA from Greece, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece, 2007 and 2010. Available at http://
www.hellenicaid.gr/frontoffice/portal.asp?cpage=NODE&cnode=1&clang=1
politicians’ aid arguments in various ‘frames’ and thereby better understand foreign 
policy decision-making (pp. 2–3). In fact, van der Veen establishes very high 
expectations about his book in the first few pages. He insists that his method – 
further expounded in three appendices – of coding and framing political speeches 
on aid will answer questions like:
Why do some countries consistently fall short of the commitments to increase foreign aid?
Why do countries persist on funding aid projects that are likely to fail? And why are some
recipient states so much more successful at attracting aid than others? (p. 4)
These are interesting questions for sure. Yet, after reading van der Veen volume, these
questions remain largely un-answered.
Van der Veen devotes a 30-page chapter – Chapter 6 ‘The generosity contest’ – to 
argue in favor of his frame method for determining the variations in aid volume. Based 
on five decades of legislative debates in the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy and Norway, 
van der Veen analyses 1400 public speaking turns. He finds 44 distinct arguments for 
giving foreign aid and regroups them into seven different frames: security, power/
influence, economic self-interest, enlightened self-interest, reputation, obligation and 
humanitarianism (pp. 45–46). Van der Veen then classifies all the arguments within 
one of the frames and makes two regression analyses of the coded arguments. 
Though he admits that ‘a number of explanatory variables may be associated with 
more than one particular frame’ (p. 39) and that ‘different communities may have 
different composite frames for aid, even within a single country’ (p. 137), his 
conclusions are firm, at times too firm. To me, it is difficult to determine whether an 
argument for example about ‘international stability’ in a debate on aid, should be 
classified under the ‘security frame’ or the ‘enlightened self-interest frame’. Van der 
Veen has chosen the latter. Based on my own experience of classifying Norwegian 
newspaper entries on severe acute respiratory syndrome into author-created coded 
categories, I recognize that the classification of most utterances is ambiguous and 
not straightforward, leaving vast room for interpretation by the author (Hansen, 
2009a, 2009b). I speculate that giving the same sources used by van der Veen to other 
researchers and asking them to classify the arguments according to van der Veen’s 
seven frames, would result in very different outcomes.
A second difficulty with van der Veen’s method is that he only measures speeches
and neglects actual political decisions. In foreign aid, as in most political arenas, what
politicians say often differs from what they actually do. In addition, some legislators’
statements are much more important than others’, both for founding policy and for
actual political outcomes.
Related to this, one may ask whether foreign policy is informed and formed by leg-
islative aid debates in the parliaments. In Norway, some argue that foreign aid policy is
formed by a small clique of academics and development aid practitioners, together with
politicians and bureaucrats with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Norwegian
Agency for Development Cooperation more than by legislative debates within the
parliament (Tvedt, 2003). Others would point to a possible positive correlation between 
public support for development aid and development aid budgets. From 1986 to 1996, 
Statistics Norway reports that a growing number of Norwegians wanted a decrease in 
foreign aid. While only 12% preferred a decrease in aid in 1986, a year with a high aid 
level (and rapidly growing GNI), by 1996, 30% proclaimed they would decrease the 
Norwegian aid budget after five years of relative stagnation (Rønning, 2000). By 
reducing his measurements to arguments within the legislative debates, van der Veen 
loses these factors.
A third critique of van der Veen’s volume would be that the international economic 
and geo-political contexts are not included in his analysis of ideas and interests 
determining foreign aid. To me, acknowledging ‘domestic factors as the driving 
forces in changing the framing of aid’ (p. 95) does not legitimize forgetting the 
international context in which foreign aid takes place.7
Finally, I think, van der Veen’s results would have gained credibility by being 
presented with a little humility, rather than with an authoritative voice. Van der 
Veen insists that ‘the success of the empirical analyses is all the more gratifying 
given the fact that . . . ’ (p. 212) and that ‘it appears unlikely that a less synthetic 
argument will be able to explain policy patterns as nicely [as I have done]’ (p. 234) 
and ‘it is more fruitful to pursue [my own] theoretical elegance’ (p. 234). I read 
these statements as subjective arrogance rather than objective, scientific excellence.
Van der Veen insists that ‘much of the variations [in aid volumes] can be explained,
once one has a measure of the frames that dominates the aid discourse’ (p. 168).
However, when aggregating data from the four countries under scrutiny, he is not
able to determine common reasons for variations in aid volumes. As an example,
van der Veen states that correlation between aid volume and welfare state expenditure
is clear only in countries which also have a strong humanitarian frame (the Netherlands
and Norway) while in welfare states without a frame of humanitarian aid discourse, the
correlation is absent or negative (Belgium) (pp. 168–169).
For sure, even if van der Veen’s goal to explain variations in aid levels over recent
decades, he agrees that finding determinants of aid volume is difficult (p. 146). Thus, I
may only continue to speculate on reasons for the increase in aid from DAC donors
since 1997. One possible answer is related to increased public and academic interest
in inequality over the last decade, both between states and within states, as such
inequality relates to a security threat.8 While it is not possible to date this change to
one particular year, the political understanding of inequality as a security threat may
have led to an increase in aid with the goal of reducing inequality.
Another reason may be the engagement of new donors in the world of development
aid. Many former recipient states, formerly only treated as recipients of development aid,
7For an analysis of domestic factors relevance for aid framing in Norway, see Borchgrevink and
Hansen (2006) sett inn.
8See e.g. Thomas (2001), Held and Kaya (2006) and Stewart (2004).
and thus understood as somewhat backward, inferior and underdeveloped states 
populated by somewhat backward, inferior and underdeveloped people, started their 
careers as development aid donors around 1997. Is it possible that the change of 
status from recipient to donor of aid, or their double status both as donor and recipient 
of development aid (as is the case with Brazil, South Africa, China, Vietnam, India and 
Turkey among others) has encouraged Western donors to increase their aid budgets? The 
new donors often have an open agenda with a focus on equal economic benefits for both 
donors and receivers. Rhetorically, this differed from the Western donors, which 
focused more on the moral responsibility for poverty alleviation. The entry of the 
non-DAC donors onto the global aid market may have scared the OECD–DAC 
countries away from the altruistic, charitable discourse on aid toward a more 
realpolitik-oriented discourse of enlightened self-interest (to use van der Veen’s 
vocabulary). In fact, I see a new Cold War sneaking into foreign aid again as China 
takes over from the USSR as the Big Bad Wolf in the Western understanding of foreign 
politics. It seems as if democracy and respect for human rights are not prerequisites 
for receiving aid any longer, as long as western aid can prevent China from gaining 
political influence and market share in developing countries. The political power of 
the DAC donors has weakened significantly as new donors have made their way 
through the jungle. Yet, DAC donor discourse around aid has gained in veracity and 
seems to be moving toward more self-oriented motives for foreign aid.
(Re-)emergence of new donors
The new, (re-)emergent donors, or non-DAC donors, as Mawdsley (2012) prefers to 
name them, are central in her new book From Recipients to Donors; Emerging 
Powers and the Changing Development Landscape. Her point of departure is that 
today the DAC-oriented ‘global consensus’ in foreign aid is ‘presently in a state of 
considerable flux’ (p. 17). Throughout the book’s seven chapters, she questions and 
refutes this consensus.
The entire volume describes and analyses the changing development aid landscape
over the last decade with a focus on non-DAC donors. She groups them into former
socialist states, rapidly industrializing states and global giants. In addition, Mawdsley
includes the new super-rich philanthropists and their foundations in her study. Discuss-
ing typical categories and concepts in the Western world of development cooperation,
she points to persistent Orientalist binaries in the discourse. Creating new or substitut-
ing old vocabulary, Mawdsley offers alternative understandings of these relations.
Through a fine and detailed analysis of a variety of non-DAC donors, she counter-
weight the asserted argument that the new donors, by most other researchers exempli-
fied by China promote their self-interest and undermine the interest of the poor. (She
adds to this argument that many traditional, western OECD donors also promote
their own economic interests, pursue their own geo-political strategies, exert soft
power and garner international status with their foreign aid, proclaimed to be in the
pure interest of the recipient poor.) Discussing global development governance, she
offers sound arguments about credibility, legitimacy and incentives of both non-
DAC donors and recipients.
Mawdsley insists that South–South development cooperation emphasizes a shared
identity based on a shared experience of suppression and/or colonial exploitation – a
specific, experience-based expertise in appropriate development approaches, a shared
rejection of hierarchy in relations and an insistence on a win–win relationship of
mutual opportunities in a foreign aid relationship (p. 152). Consequently, she actively
examines norms, rituals and rhetorics in foreign aid relations. Although she mentions
that ‘a complex array of rhetorics, realpolitiks and intended and unintended outcomes
is characteristic of all donor/recipient/partner relations’, she manages in an exemplary
way, to make these elements from a broad selection of non-DAC donors lucid and clear
to the reader. Problematizing complex issues and a variety of donors does not lead her
into obscurity or vagueness. Rather, she offers us a clear comprehensive, instructive
analysis of the new world in foreign aid.
Mawdsley’s book is an informative, well-documented heaven for anyone interested 
in the latest changes in development cooperation. She offers a comprehensive 
presentation and an ample analysis of new donors of development aid since the turn 
of the century. Mawdsley uses data from numerous valid sources and her 
analyses are dense and to the point. Her bibliography is loaded with the latest and 
most valuable reads in aid literature, literature that has been actively and 
pertinently used while writing her volume. Her 270-page paperback deserves a 
large readership for many years to come. It is a treasure both for development 
studies and political science students, aid workers, politicians and bureaucrats within 
ministries of foreign affairs.
Old stereotypes in development aid
In sharp contrast to Mawdsley’s (2012) fine book is Fee’s volume How to Manage an 
Aid Exit Strategy: The Future of Development Aid (Fee, 2012). If you have ever spent 
some time at a typical African expatriate bar populated by foreign development aid 
staff, you would probably have heard every argument Fee makes in his book. Fee 
starts his book by stating that the three main problems with development aid today 
are mission creep, lack of exit strategy and the symbiotic relationship between 
donors and recipients of aid. All three are well-known pitfalls in the aid business. 
Pointing to random statistical data, mostly from Africa, Fee argues that, despite 
having received heavy loads of development aid for four decades, there is a total 
‘lack of results to date’ (p. 20).
Fee goes on to give ‘a short history of development aid’ (Chapter 2). In fact, he
prefers to name it a ‘Cinderella business par excellence’ (p. 19). As a trained historian,
I would prefer to call what Fee gives us not ‘a short history of’, but ‘a story’. His chap-
ters on aid and the aid business are so filled with pathetic critique justified by random
samples of malfunctioning aid initiative that it compares to a late bar night discussion
rather than an intelligent book. Fee throws arguments in all directions. Sometime he 
critiques coordination: ‘Why do aid agencies maintain their existence when there has 
been a recognition among [the] development community that aid coordination eats 
up a large amount of human resources?’ (p. 46), while he at other stages critiques 
implicitly the lack of coordination: ‘African governments spend an inordinate 
amount of time and effort in explaining their policies and actions to [the] donor com-
munity.’ (p. 62). On other occasions, he states blithely that ‘development aid works has 
changed little since the first interventions with the newly independent African nations in 
the 1960s’ (p. 59) while at the same time arguing that small-scale development aid has 
moved away from project support to broader program support and that large-scale 
multilateral aid has moved from structural adjustment loans to general budget 
support (pp. 54–55). He also insists that ‘the BRICS present a totally different 
development model’ (p. 45). No changes?
Fee offers a variety of themes in chapters as different in level of analysis and content 
as ‘The BRICS’ (Chapter 6) and ‘Microfinance’ (Chapter 8). In my view, most chapters 
are packed with miscellaneous information and narrations. Only once does Fee 
explicitly write that he will ‘finish [the chapter] with an anecdote’. In my view, this 
anecdote is representative of the style, level of argument and quality of the entire 
volume and I will therefore fully quote it:
I attended a meeting of the Budget Support group with the Government of Zambia at the
end of November 2010. The government boasted 24 members led by the Secretary of
Treasury. The donor group was just less weighty at 21 individuals, which included
four ambassadors and several heads of aid agencies. The meeting lasted two hours and
took no decisions. A total of 90 man-hours (excluding travel) had been wasted without
any result. Aid still has a long way to go. (p. 63)
In fact, only the last chapter (Chapter 11) attempts directly to answer the title of the
book ‘How to manage an aid exit strategy’. In this chapter, Fee starts off by telling
us that many countries are totally dependent on development aid; Liberia’s ODA/
GNI ratio is 78; Burundi’s is 41. To make countries less aid-dependent, Fee suggests
five focus areas: (1) institutional development, (2) domestic resource mobilization,
(3) economic diversification, (4) increased global funds and (5) self-help aid. All
these issues were identified decades back and are very well known to everyone even
slightly interested in foreign aid. Unfortunately, Fee does not propose any new thoughts
or ideas on how to solve these problems. Thus, Fee’s volume may only be of interest to
populist critics of development aid who want to keep their arguments unsullied.
However, filled as it is with acronyms (on page 57 alone we read about ‘SALs’,
‘PRGF’, ‘MDRI’, ‘PSBS’ and ‘PAF’ in addition to the more commonly known
‘HIPC’ and ‘IMF’), even these readers may have trouble following.
On the cover page, we can read various praises for Fee’s volume. According to one,
‘Fee’s book is a must-read for development practitioners and policy makers who are
seeking a new paradigm to the conventional aid model’ while according to another
admirer, Fee’s book is ‘high-quality and extremely detailed’. My opinion is that Fee’s
book resembles a late-night bar conversation: the reader is not supposed to remember
anything said earlier, only to laugh at others and agree with the storyteller. I did not
laugh, nor even chuckle, while reading this volume. Nor did the reading of Fee’s
volume give me any new ideas, inspiration, knowledge or thoughts.
New landscapes; what strategies?
During the last decade the landscape of foreign aid has changed considerably. The 
1990s ‘good governance’ conditionality-regime which added to the economic-
liberalization-regime from 1980s had not created the ‘development’ it had 
promised, especially not in Africa, at the turn of the millennium. In fact, Africa had 
a negative GNI/Capita from 1980 to 2000 (Sachs et al., 2004). The share of the 
African population living in poverty is very high (45–50%) and has remained on 
the same level between 1980 and 2000 (Organization of Islamic Conference, 
2007). During the same period, the actual number of poor people in Africa 
increased (Collier, n.d.). The democratization process in Africa during the 1990s 
kept many of the old regimes in power and the degree of democracy is 
considered very low in many countries (Hansen, 2010a). Lack of expected 
developments resulted in an increased individual and institutional donor fatigue in 
the 1990s.
However, with the ‘war on terror’ and China’s entre´e as an important donor and
investor in Africa from the beginning of 2000s, the donor fatigue has changed character
and the prerequisites for receiving aid has again changed. Instead of reducing ODA like
donors did in the 1990s, the OECD countries have changed their priorities toward a
more businesslike development assistance. While the main goal still is to reduce
poverty, the way to do it now focuses on private investments, creation of businesses
and business partnerships. The ‘good governance’ mantra from the 1990s has passed
away in debates on development aid.
The three volumes here reviewed have one common denominator: they are all
recent volumes discussion foreign aid. However, in quality and interest they differ
heavily. While Mawdley’s volume deserves a broad scholarly readership for years to
come, van der Veen’s volume is more of interest to scholars interested in methods
for measuring political decision-making. Fee’s volume would, may be, find readers
among ignorant foreign aid critics, snapping a light volume at an airport bookstore.
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